This article aims to test a proposition widely spread among scholars and journalists according to which holidays would have an impact on electoral turnout. To our knowledge, this possibility has not been investigated in the French case yet. Our data, gathered for the last three presidential elections, strongly support a negative effect of holidays on turnout. Since turnout and left vote are linked, this negative influence helps to explain the defeat of the main left-wing candidate in 2002 even though it does not represent the single factor.
"One can miss the first round, not its holidays."
Advertising slogan 1 In a previous paper, we emphasized the role of the climate in the determination of the electoral turnout in France (Ben Lakhdar and Dubois, 2006) . Variables such as temperature, precipitation or sunshine have a strong and significant impact on the turnout at legislative elections.
Our purpose in this brief article is to assess the influence of another circumstantial variable on turnout: the holidays 2 . This work is then encompassed in a larger framework dealing with turnout. It takes source up to the theoretical assertion that the choice to vote or not is rational. According to this theory, individuals decide to vote or not according to the expected utility got from their vote defined as the difference between the expected benefits derived, for example, from the political program and the costs to vote. These costs include, among others, opportunity costs to collect information about the political programs and transport costs, as the time spent on the way to the polls. Our works go further by assuming that seasonal factors alter the perception of the voting costs. We consider that they translate the strong discontent of some people. Seasonal factors can be used by "fragile citizens" as a pretext to not go to vote. Regarding the holidays, they value their holidays, which take them far from home, more than the ballot day, which requires their presence at home 3 concerned by holidays and one estimated that about 4 to 5 million of them left their home 4 . In a poll lead after the first round, 16 % of the abstainers said that they did not vote because "they were on holidays, gone away for the weekend or were out for a walk" 5 .
The holidays, as a determinant of turnout, have been identified long time ago by scholars.
Numerous studies mention a possible link between holidays and turnout (e.g. Abrams, 1970; Turner, 1972; Denver and Hands, 1974; Crewe, 1975; Sigelman and Berry, 1982; Swaddle and Heath, 1989; Blondel et al., 1997) but formal tests are few (Blais et al., 2004; Anderson and Beramendi, 2006) . In Blais et al. (2004) , the authors introduce a dummy variable in their microanalysis of vote participation in Canada that is worth 1 if the election is held in winter or in summer, and 0 otherwise. This variable, interpreted as a proxy for holidays since holidays generally take place in these seasons in Canada, is significant and negative-signed. Anderson and Beramendi (2006) confirm this result in their analysis of the turnout in 14 OECD
hal-00800667, version 1 -14 Mar 2013
countries for 1980-2002. In this study, the holiday variable is a dummy that takes 1 if the election is held on a holiday, and 0 otherwise. In a somewhat close problematic, Franklin (1996) shows that in countries where people vote on Sunday the turnout is higher.
In countries where the Election Day is a working day, setting the ballot on the weekend or on holiday has been proposed to decrease abstention (e.g. Squire et al., 1987; Green and Shachar, 2000; Freeman, 2003; Just, 2005; Hill, 2006) . But Gray and Caul (2000) show that to set elections on a weekend or holiday when it was previously on a nonholiday is not relevant in explaining the trend of change in turnout in 18 OECD countries between 1950 and 1997. In Brazil, the Election Day is declared public holiday to facilitate the vote that is compulsory (Power and Roberts, 1995) . But declaring Election Day as a public holiday may be dangerous if the Election Day is close to the weekend. Indeed, people can take an extended weekend that leads to a weak turnout as it was apparently the case in South Africa (Alence, 2004; Piombo, 2004) .
One can wonder why so few empirical studies have included holidays, and more generally seasonal factors, among their determinants of turnout. At least three arguments can be advanced. Firstly, turnout can be mainly explained by socio-demographic variables (age, gender, study level, diploma, religious practice…). Most empirical studies then privilege theses "heavy variables" and others variables are seen as marginal. Secondly, one can think that the impact of seasonal factors on turnout is recent. Indeed, until the 80's, the turnout rates were quite high; to vote was the rule and to abstain was the exception. The apparition of a dramatic decreasing trend in turnout (lassitude due to political scandals, repetition of ballots, similarities in political platforms, poor performances of the incumbent…) has modified the behavior of some people. Turnout is no longer viewed as a duty. Abstention is now commonplace and anything is a pretext to abstain. This is why the importance of seasonal factors has grown. Studies of the past do not take them into account simply because they were not relevant at this time. Thirdly, the lack of data (especially climatic ones) or the complexity of the holiday agenda may explain the difficulties for some author to introduce these variables in their models.
If the influence of climatic conditions on turnout in France is now established, the impact of holidays has not been tested in the French case yet. Our study aims to fill this gap 6 . Firstly, we present the setting of the French holidays. After having described the variables, the data and the methodology, we then show the estimations' results. One extension is explored before closing by some conclusive remarks.
The setting of holidays in France 
The Model
The dependent variable, notedTURN , is the turnout in the French departments for the first round of the three last presidential elections of the Fifth Republic. We have then four choices to justify: the electoral unit, the relevant round, the level of elections and the studied period.
France is subdivided in "regions", each of them, subdivided in several "departments". We retained six potential explanatory variables. The first one is a variable that catches the discontent due to the economic situation. The argument is that, in case of poor macroeconomic performances, voters who usually supported the incumbent prefer to abstain rather to vote against her. We have retained the unemployment rate to account for the economic situation. More precisely, UNEM is the difference in the departmental unemployment rate between the quarter prior to the election and four quarters before (that is on one year). This measure is frequently retained in the French vote-functions literature (see for example Jérôme and Jérôme-Speziari, 2004 ). We expect a negative sign for the coefficient of UNEM since this variable traduces a discontent. Two remarks can be made. First, when macroeconomic records are poor, turnout could be higher since some voters that usually abstain go to polls to sanction the ruling majority. Second, UNEM expresses one particular form of discontent, namely an economic one. Others forms of discontent can be envisaged as for example a discontent linked to scandals or to the weariness effect of being in power.
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Rice and Macht, 1987), a candidate has an advantage in the electoral territory of which she is a native. This is the so-called "friends and neighbors effect". Because she is known by a lot of voters in her native area and since voters are proud to have a candidate born in the same region as theirs, she gets an additional support. This effect that is traditionally applied to the vote may be transposed to the turnout. People that usually abstain can vote for a candidate with the same geographical origins. We define then a variable, noted LOC, that takes 1 in the department from which a candidate is originating, and 0 otherwise. We retained only the professional origin, that is the department where mandates were fulfilled. We also limited ourselves to the three main candidates for the first round since most of minor candidates do not have any mandate. Positive sign is expected for the coefficient of this variable. . On one hand, turnout can be higher since, for a potential voter, the probability to have her political sensibility represented increases. On the other hand, people can be embarrassed by this abundance of choice and may abstain in order to wait for the selection operated at the first round. To investigate a possible effect of the heterogeneity of the political supply, we have constructed a variable that is simply for each election of our sample the number of candidates at the first round. Due to the two aforementioned arguments, the sign of the coefficient of this variable is unknown.
The two following independent variables are the climatic variables on the Electoral day:
temperature and precipitation. In order to take into account the geographical heterogeneity, we chose to withdraw the long term trend of our climatic data. Indeed, for example, 20
Celsius degrees are not experienced in the same way in a northern department than in a southern department. In order to erase these disparities and therefore to capture the exceptional character of some precipitations, temperatures or sunshine, we withdrew the "climatic standard" that is the monthly average on a thirty-years-period. We then use the following variables: PREC is the height in millimeters of precipitation fallen between 6 a.m.
and 6 p.m. on the voting day and TEMP is the arithmetic mean of the temperature in Celsius degrees measured at 6 a.m. and 6 p.m. on the voting day. Both are expressed in difference with the long term tendency observed on the period The second seasonal factor is the holidays. Since, in our sample, elections are held in late April, the sole holidays that may affect turnout are the spring holidays. The Table 1 brings their dates for each area.
[ In relation with this last variable, it is interesting to mention here the possibility of a vote by proxy ("procuration" in French). Until 1993, the absence of the city of residence was not a case eligible for a vote by proxy. After the law of July, 6 1993, people on holidays 11 and not present on the Electoral Day can ask for a vote by proxy providing they bring some An interesting extension with our holiday variable is to examine if the turnout is affected by the fact that the ballot holds on the first, the second or the third week-end of the holidays. 
Let us turn to the description of the sample and to the presentation of the estimation results. As one can see from column 1, all the explicative variables have the expected sign and are significant at 10 % or less except LOC and TEMP. For the localism variable, that means that one does not participate more in department from which an important candidate is originating.
Sample and Estimation Results
For TEMP, it is a little bit more complicated. A possible explanation, as mentioned earlier, lies in the non-linear character of this variable. One can think that the sign of the coefficient is positive on one part of the sample and negative on the other part so that, on the entire sample,
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the coefficient is non significant. After having dropping these irrelevant variables, we obtain the results shown in column 2. They confirm an impact of the climate on the turnout with a strong negative influence of precipitation: 11 millimeters of precipitation more (compared to a normal day) lead to a decrease of the turnout of about 0.5 point. Our discontent variable, UNEM, indicates that when the departmental unemployment rate increases of 1 point in the year preceding the presidential election, the turnout decreases of about 0.5 point 23 . The candidate variable has a negative sign and then attests of a "confusion effect" due to the multiplication of the candidates: 1 candidate more leads to a higher abstention rate of 1 point.
It confirms the result obtained by Fauvelle-Aymar and François (2005) for the 1997 legislative election. Finally, our holidays variable is strongly significant: in departments where people are on holidays, the turnout rate is lower of about 1.7 points.
Column 3 exhibits the estimation output when HOL is split according to the presence of the ballot on the first, second or third week-end of the holidays. All these variables are significant and have the expected (negative) sign. This confirms that departments on holidays participate less in the election. More interesting, the coefficient of WE2 is larger than the one of WE1 and WE3. The turnout is affected by about, respectively, 1.6 points, 2.1 points, and 1.1 points in departments where the ballot is held on the first, second, and third week-end of the holidays. People seem to postpone their departure or bring forward their return of holidays to vote while if the election date is during the second week-end, people give up the idea to make an effort to vote (i.e. it costs more to cut the holidays in the middle).
Further results: did holidays cost the final to the main left-wing candidate in 2002?
According to the literature, in France, abstention penalizes left-wing parties (see, among others, Fauvelle-Aymar et al., 2000, and Ben Lakhdar and Dubois, 2006) . The explanation may reside in the similarities between abstainers and left-wing voters. Indeed, these two groups present several common features as for example youth, weak attachment to the Catholic religion, or low level of education (see Mossuz-Lavau, 1997 What is for sure is that this proportion has to be 95.4 % to change the second round (372.311 of 390.224) and the true proportion is surely lesser. Holidays then cannot explain in themselves the defeat of the left-wing candidate in 2002.
Conclusion
Holidays are often invoked by both scholars and journalists to explain a low turnout. By skimming through the literature, it is striking to note that formal tests are scarce and even non-existent in the French case. To fill this gap, we have built and estimated an econometric model of turnout at the first round of presidential elections. To control the possible effect of holidays, we used proxies for political supply, popular discontent, socio-demographic context hal-00800667, version 1 -14 Mar 2013
and other seasonal factors as climatic conditions. The main result of our study is that holidays have a strong depressive effect on turnout. In departments concerned with holidays, the turnout rate is ceteris paribus lower by about 1.7 points.
Since there exists a positive link between turnout and Left vote, it is tempting to see if holidays have had an influence on the outcome of the first round in the past. To investigate this possibility, we have examined the case of the 2002 election for which the main left-wing candidate missed the second round by less of 400.000 votes. What emerges from this case study is that holidays explain only a part, but a significant part, of these missing votes.
A normative prescription of this result is quite obvious: a right-wing incumbent has to set the ballot during the holiday time to gather more votes 27 . What has been decided for the Further researches could be driven on seasonal determinants of turnout. From a technical point of view, as thresholds on climatic variables may exist, non-linear econometrics could be mobilized to highlight these effects. Using infra-day climatic data, if available, should also be profitable. In a socio-demographical perspective, it would be interesting to know who is more affected by seasonal determinants (urban versus rural, young versus old, male versus female…). In particular, who go on holidays? Are potential left-wing voters really overrepresented among abstainers? Finally, it would be of a great interest to study the vote by proxy in order to determine the efficiency of policy measures that aim to decrease the voting costs.
1 This slogan of a tour operator appeared in the newspaper Libération the day after the first round of the presidential election of 2002. It can be understood as a joke towards the candidates knocked out at the first round since the original sentence in French ("on peut rater le premier tour, pas ses vacances") can be translated "one can fail in the first round, not in its holidays". 2 Here and hereafter, we mean by "holidays", holidays given by the administration to boys and girls who frequent primary school or high school. , 1990 and 1999) .
Outside this theoretical argument that leads us to assume that the fixed effects are better for our model, the Hausman test does not recommend the alternative specification (i.e. the random effects model). 15 The source is www.insee.fr for both population and area data. 16 In our previous paper, we introduced a trend that captured the political weariness that characterizes the French voter since more than thirty years. In the present case, this downward trend appears to be lightened. Indeed, the turnout rate has decreased from 83. analysis. 17 The following departments are concerned: 07, 08, 10, 15, 19, 22, 23, 24, 27, 32, 39, 41, 43, 48, 49, 50, 53, 55, 74, 79, 81, 82, 85, 88, 92, 93, 94 . For practical reasons, here and hereafter, we indicate only the number of departments. The full list is displayed in appendix (table 5) . 18 For the department 62.
elections (3), we have deleted the sunshine variable in order to gather more departments to insure a comparable sample size. 20 We just remind that climatic variables are expressed in difference with the climatic standard.
The sources are the website http://climatheque.meteo.fr for the climatic variables, Météo France (1996) 25 We have removed the two Corsican departments since, as mentioned earlier, we do not know if they were on holidays or not. 26 We obtain broadly the same result if we discriminate the holidays effect according to the week-end on which the ballot takes place (the figure is 343.749). 27 The left-wing opposition cannot influence the holiday calendar but can promise in turn, in her platform, more holidays in order to enhance "holiday fanatics" to stay at home to vote and then to abstain to go on holidays… 28 With the other set of dates, all the three areas should have been on holidays. The French Home Office has then chosen the more disadvantageous option for him from the point of view of our normative prescription. We can notice however that this is a second best since another possibility more unfavourable for him would be a change in the constitutional law to enlarge the window during which the election must hold and thus to be sure to have a Sunday out of the holidays period. 
